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ARTICLES
GETTING PHYSICAL: EXCLUDING PERSONAL





The 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code are an understandable, but fundamentally incorrect, reac-
tion to a statutory rule that was seen to have careened out of
control with respect to nonphysical personal injuries. The rule of
§ 104(a)(2), since its enactment in 1919, was that damages re-
ceived on account of personal injury were excludable from gross
income. After a brief initial period during which these qualifying
personal injuries were administratively limited to physical inju-
ries,' it became clear, during the 1920s and thereafter, that both
physical and nonphysical injuries were within the scope of the
rule.2 For most of its history, however, the rule was a little-no-
ticed backwater in the Code, confined in practice largely to dam-
ages from physical injuries and a limited number of nonphysical
injuries such as defamation and loss of consortium.' But over
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the past twenty-five years, through various judicial and adminis-
trative rulings, the exclusion came to encompass a new, wide
variety of nonphysical injuries-most particularly those based on
laws prohibiting discrimination in employment-as well as all
the economic and noneconomic damages linked to them. This ex-
pansion of the scope of the statute in the nonphysical area was
unchecked by any limiting definition of the term "personal inju-
ry" (neither the statute nor the regulations provided one) or by
an articulated policy that § 104(a)(2) was designed to serve (the
legislative history provided none, and no policy consensus
emerged from the plethora of judicial, administrative and aca-
demic pronouncements on the provision). The 1996 legislative
response to this expansion was to limit the § 104(a)(2) exclusion
to physical injuries only.4
The dissatisfaction with the pre-1996 scope of § 104(a)(2) is
indeed understandable: § 104(a)(2) seemed to stand for the prop-
osition that any recovery-certainly any nonpunitive recov-
ery-based on any tort or tort-like claim was nontaxable. The
1996 amendments represent a firm rejection of that proposition.
But the remedy chosen to limit an overbroad statute, the draw-
ing of a line between physical and nonphysical injuries, has
introduced its own difficulties and is not supportable from a tax
policy standpoint. The virtue of this particular line-drawing
presumably lies in cutting back the scope of § 104(a)(2) in an
apparently administrable manner; however, no substantial poli-
cy-based justification was advanced for distinguishing between
physical and nonphysical injuries.
The thesis of this Article, then, is that while § 104(a)(2) was
in need of remedy, the remedy chosen is both insupportable from
the standpoint of tax policy and problematic in terms of
administrability. A better remedy can be devised, and a proposal
toward that end is revisited in Part V of this article. To provide
background regarding § 104(a)(2), Part II of this article traces
the recent history of the statute's judicial construction focusing
on the decisions in Threlkeld v. Commissioner,' United States v.
4. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110
Stat. 1755, 1838-39 § 1605(a). The 1996 amendments also clarified that punitive
damages, whether arising out of physical or nonphysical injuries, were not
excludable. See id. This amendment built on a 1989 amendment that provided that
punitive damages in connection with nonphysical injuries were not within § 104(a)(2)
but was silent with regard to punitive damages in physical injury cases. See § 104(a)
[19891; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
2106, 2379 § 7641(a).
5. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
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Burke,' and Commissioner v. Schleier,7 and O'Gilvie v. United
States.8 Part III discusses the provisions of the 1996 amend-
ments to § 104(a)(2). Part IV demonstrates the impact of the
1996 amendments on dignitary torts and highlights policy and
interpretational problems associated with the amended provi-
sion.
II. PRELUDE TO THE 1996 AMENDMENTS: THE SUPREME COURT
NARROWS THE EXCLUSION
The Supreme Court provided its only interpretation of
§ 104(a)(2) in three cases in the 1990s, with its 1995 decision,
Commissioner v. Schleier,9 significantly narrowing the scope of
the exclusion. Prior to that time, the Tax Court in Threlkeld v.
Commissioner marked out this scope, giving a sweeping breadth
to § 104(a)(2) when it ruled that a "personal injury" referred to
"any invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by vir-
tue of being a person in the sight of the law.""° This definition
easily encompassed not only traditional nonphysical injuries
such as defamation, but a broad array of newly-minted, and
generally employment-related, actions for nonphysical injuries
such as the denial of First Amendment rights," discrimination
on the basis of sex, race and national origin, 2 and retaliatory
discharge from employment. 3
Moreover, according to Threlkeld, the exclusion could not
properly be limited only to those components of an award that
compensate for noneconomic losses; economic losses were also
excludable:
Whether the damages received are paid on account of 'personal
injuries' should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry. To
determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we
must look to the origin and character of the claim ... and not
to the consequences that result from the injury."
The Tax Court noted that, with respect to physical injuries,
6. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
7. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
8. 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
9. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
10. 87 T.C. 1284, 1308 (1986), af/'d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
11. See Bent v. Comissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834 (1987), afld, 845 F.2d 1013
(1988).
13. See Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3rd Cir. 1989).
14. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299 (citation omitted).
1997]
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
which almost by definition are "personal" in nature, "the entire
award is excluded from income even if all or a part of the recov-
ery is determined with reference to the income lost because of
the injury."" The same result was now obtained for nonphysical
injuries, and the court would no longer mount an inquiry "to
determine whether the components of the injuries for which the
award [is] made are personal or professional." 6
The Threlkeld standards largely survived the Supreme
Court's first examination of § 104(a)(2) in 1992 in United States
v. Burke.7 In Burke, employees of the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity (TVA) brought, and ultimately settled, an action against the
TVA under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that
the TVA had engaged in illegal sex discrimination. 8
In reversing the lower court's decision, which held the settle-
ment amount excludable, 9 the Supreme Court emphasized that
the regulation ' interpreting § 104(a)(2) links "personal injury"
with tort principles by defining damages received as an amount
received through prosecution or settlement of a claim "based
upon tort or tort-type rights."2 According to the Court, the
question to be asked in § 104(a)(2) cases is therefore whether the
injury complained of is a tort type personal injury.22 While ac-
knowledging that discrimination is "an invidious practice that
causes grave harm to its victims,"" the Court noted that such
harm "does not automatically imply, however, that there exists a
tort-like 'personal injury' for purposes of the federal income tax
law."24 The Court stressed that "remedial principles... figure
prominently in the definition and conceptualization of torts.
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the
availability of a broad range of damages to compensate the
plaintiff."25 The Court noted the limited nature of the remedies
afforded by Title VII, i.e., backpay and injunctive relief.26 Be-
cause of the circumscribed remedies available, the Court conclud-
15. Id. at 1300.
16. Id.
17. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
18. See id. at 230-31.
19. See Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
21. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234.
22. See id. at 237.
23. Id. at 238 (citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234-35 (citations omitted).
26. See id. at 238.
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ed that the amounts received by the taxpayers in settlement of
their claims were not "damages received on account of personal
injuries" within the meaning of § 104(a)(2).2" Although Burke
thus limited the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to some extent, it did so by
focusing on the remedial scheme of the underlying statutory
cause of action, not on the scope of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion
itself.
Commissioner v. Schleier, s addressing the excludability of
awards for back pay and liquidated damages under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), shifted the focus to
the statutory language, to the question of whether the damages
received were "on account of" personal injury.29 Prior to
Schleier, considerable confusion existed in the lower courts as to
the excludability of ADEA awards, but the confusion centered
neither on the Threlkeld definition of personal injury, nor on its
direction to focus on whether the injury is personal instead of
whether its consequences include economic loss. The confusion
centered on the interpretation of Burke, on whether an ADEA
action could be considered a tort or tort-type action, rather than
on the question of whether the damages were "on account of,"
i.e., actually compensated for personal injuries. Schleier would
force a change in this focus.3°
27. Id. at 242.
28. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
29. See id.
30. Indicative of the impact of Burke on the interpretation and application of
section 104(aX2) is Rev. Rul. 93-88, issued by the Internal Revenue Service [hereinaf-
ter Service] immediately following the Burke decision. The ruling purports to apply
the Burke standard to an action under amended Title VII. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-
2 C.B. 61. The 1991 amendments to Title VII which were not applicable to the
Burke litigation allowed complaining parties to recover compensatory and punitive
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) against an employer who engages in disparate
treatment discrimination. Under § 1981(a), compensatory damages are available for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss
of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Given
this broadened range of remedies, the Service in Rev. Rul. 93-88 concluded that
actions under Title VII could now be characterized as tort or tort-type in nature. See
Rev. Rul. 93-88. Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-53 I.R.B. 5. Applying its understanding of
Burke, the Service therefore concluded that a taxpayer could exclude an award for
disparate gender discrimination "even if the compensatory damages in such a case
are limited to backpay." Id.
The Service in Rev. Rul. 93-88, thus, essentially interpreted Burke to mean
that if an action sounds in tort because of the broad range of remedies available,
then whatever damages are received, even backpay, are excludable. The fact that
backpay does not compensate the taxpayer for any personal harms suffered is simply
ignored.
In view of Schleier and the amendments to § 104(a)(2), Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-
53 I.R.B. 5, made obsolete Rev. Rul. 93-88. The 1996 ruling considered whether
1997] 171
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In Schleier, a United Airline pilot argued that the backpay
and liquidated damages that he received in settlement of a claim
under the ADEA were excludable under § 104(a)(2). The claim
was based on the fact that United fired him when he reached the
age of sixty.3 The Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit agreed with
the taxpayer that both the backpay and liquidated damages
recovered were excludable under § 104(a)(2).32 The Supreme
Court, reversing, held that based upon the plain language of §
104(a)(2), the taxpayer's claim must fail.33 In a key part of its
opinion, the Court reasoned that attaining the age of sixty or
being discharged from employment on account of age did not
itself constitute a personal injury.34 The Court acknowledged
that an illegal discharge could cause some personal injury, e.g.,
psychological injury, and it suggested that to the extent which
the taxpayer was compensated for such an injury, the compensa-
tion received would be excludable.35
This distinction locates "personal injury" not in an event-an
act of age discrimination itself-but in its impacts, in the harms
it causes to the person. The Supreme Court, in making this dis-
tinction, effectively repudiated the Threlkeld standard, under
which a personal injury consisted of "any invasion of the rights"
granted by virtue of being a person in the eyes of the law." Al-
though the invasion of a right may give rise to a tort or tort type
action for damages, critical questions remain: Did that invasion
cause a personal injury and, if so, did the compensation received
constitute damages "on account of' that personal injury? Thus,
for example, the backpay in Schleier could be excluded, but only
if it were "attributable" to a personal injury, i.e., if there was the
backpay and damages for emotional distress "received in satisfaction of a claim for
denial of a promotion due to disparate treatment employment discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended in 1991," are excludable from gross
income under § 104(a)(2) as amended. Rev. Rul. 96-65. The ruling concludes:
Back pay . . . under Title VII is not excludable from gross income under
Section 104(a)(2) because it is completely independent of, and thus is not
damages received on account of, personal physical injuries or physical sick-
ness under that section. Similarly, amounts received for emotional distress
in satisfaction of such a claim are not excludable from gross income under
Section 104(a)(2), except to the extent they are damages paid for medical
care . . . attributable to emotional distress.
Id.
31. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2161.
32. See id. at 2162-63.
33. See id. at 2167.
34. See id. at 2164.
35. See id.
36. See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986).
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appropriate nexus (causal relationship) between the backpay and
a personal injury. According to the Court, however, no such nex-
us or causal linkage existed in Schleier and therefore the "on
account of" requirement of § 104(a)(2) was not satisfied.37
The Court explained its position as follows: In age discrimi-
nation, the discrimination may cause both personal injury (such
as psychological harm) and loss of wages (due to the illegal dis-
charge), but neither is linked to the other. Under the ADEA
statutory scheme, "[t]he amount of back wages recovered is com-
pletely independent of the existence or extent of any personal
injury."3" In short, § 104(a)(2) does not permit the exclusion of
Schleier's back wages because the recovery of back wages was
not "on account of' any personal injury and because no personal
injury affected the amount of back wages recovered. Absent the
relationship required by the statute between the damages re-
ceived and the personal injury complained of, exclusion under §
104(a)(2) was inappropriate.
The Court contrasted the taxpayer's situation to that of an
individual injured in an automobile accident, who, as a result of
her injuries, "suffers (a) medical expenses, (b) lost wages, and (c)
pain, suffering, and emotional distress that cannot be measured
with precision."" The Court noted that the amounts received in
a settlement for the lost wages resulting "from time in which the
taxpayer was out of work as a result of her injuries"'" (as well
as for her medical expense and pain and suffering) would be
excludable "not simply because the taxpayer received a tort set-
tlement, but rather because each element of the settlement satis-
fies the requirement set forth in section 104(a)(2) ... that the
damages were received 'on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness."41 The exclusion of the lost wages in the Court's hypo-
thetical, as contrasted to the tax treatment of Mr. Schleier's
award for back wages, is thus appropriate according to the Court
because the relationship required by § 104(a)(2) between damag-
es and personal injury exists: the automobile "accident causes a
personal injury which in turn causes a loss of wages."42
37. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164.
38. Id. The Court's discussion suggests the same kind of analysis employed by
the Fourth Circuit in its Miller decision when it distinguished between "but for"
causation and "substantial causation." See Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th
Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
39. Schleier, 115 S.Ct. at 2163-64.





With respect to the liquidated damages recovered, the tax-
payer in Schleier argued that, even if the backpay was
includable, the liquidated damages were not because they repre-
sented not a penalty or punishment but rather compensation for
"damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate."' The
Court agreed with the taxpayer "that if Congress had intended
the ADEA's liquidated damages to compensate plaintiffs for
personal injuries, those damages might well come within sec-
tion 104(a)(2)'s exclusion."" The Court, however, disagreed with
the taxpayer's characterization of the liquidated damages. In-
stead of being compensatory, the Court noted that it had previ-
ously concluded that "Congress intended for liquidated damages
[under the ADEA] to be punitive in nature."' As such, the liq-
uidated damages could not be characterized as having been re-
ceived "on account of personal injuries."46
The standard articulated by the Court in Schleier appears to
be that the only damages which are "on account of" personal
injuries for § 104(a)(2) purposes are those that bear a close nexus
to the personal injury, i.e., "the injury in and of itself justifies
[the] damages""7 or the damages are intended to compensate
the taxpayer for the personal injury and the consequences caus-
ally linked to the injury. If that relationship between the damag-
es and personal injuries does not exist, no exclusion is available.
Thus, for example, in Schleier, because the Court concluded that
the liquidated damages were not intended to compensate the
taxpayer for any personal injuries, e.g., psychological harm, but
rather were intended to punish the wrongdoer, no exclusion for
the liquidated damages was appropriate. Similarly, the backpay
was not excludable because the necessary nexus between the
backpay and a personal injury did not exist, i.e, regardless of
whether the taxpayer suffered any personal injury as a result of
his discharge from employment at age sixty, he was still entitled
to the backpay under the ADEA. In other words, the backpay
was not intended to compensate the taxpayer for a personal
43. Id. (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84
(1942)).
44. Id. at 2165.
45. Id. (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125
(1985)).
46. The Supreme Court subsequently held in O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 452 (1996), that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion (as it existed prior to the 1996 amend-
ments) did not include punitive damages. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
47. Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 230-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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injury or its consequences but rather to ensure that the taxpayer
received those wages which the taxpayer would have earned had
the taxpayer not been illegally discharged.
This interpretation of the "on account of' language consti-
tutes a far narrower test than the "but for" test employed by
many courts, under which damages would be excluded if the
taxpayer could establish that the damages were received "be-
cause" the taxpayer had sustained a tort or tort-type personal
injury. Under this analysis, it was irrelevant whether the dam-
ages were actually intended to compensate the taxpayer for the
personal injury. By contrast, the Schleier standard requires a
much more direct relationship between the damages and the
personal injury, i.e., the damages must be intended to compen-
sate for the personal injury.
In some respects, the standard adopted by the Schleier Court
is identical to the historic "in lieu of what" test of Raytheon Pro-
duction Corp. v. Commissioner." That test arguably provides
the narrowest interpretation of the "on account of' language,
ensuring that only those damages for personal injury (damages
in lieu of the human capital lost to the injury) are excludable.
Strictly applied, the "in lieu of what" test would result in
backpay, lost wages and other damages for nonpersonal harms
never being excluded unless it could be established that they
were intended as measures of the personal injury.
But Schleier, in dictum, suggests a more generous test. The
Schleier Court indicated that lost wages were excludable, at least
in the car accident hypothetical where the lost wages are attrib-
utable to the "time in which the taxpayer was out of work as a
result of her injuries."49 This hypothetical indicates that
excludable damages are not only those damages intended to
compensate for the personal injury itself-loss of human capi-
tal-but also damages for economic losses if they are causally
linked to the personal injury. Therefore, to the extent that an
award or settlement compensates the taxpayer for a personal
injury, it can be deemed to compensate the taxpayer for all loss-
es flowing from that personal injury including economic losses.
In the car accident hypothetical, the loss of wages is causally
linked to the physical injury sustained (because of the personal
injury the victim was unable to work) and therefore the amount
received for lost wages is deemed an amount received "on ac-
48. 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944).
49. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164 (citing Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300).
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count of personal injuries.""
Under Schleier, it is thus clear that the fact that losses
might be economic in nature is not determinative if the appropri-
ate causal linkage exists between the personal injury and the
loss. Applying this standard to the Schleier Court's car accident
hypothetical, the lost wages would be excludable because they
were received to compensate the taxpayer for her inability to
work, which was a direct consequence of the physical injuries
she suffered as a result of the car accident. By contrast, the back
pay awarded in Schleier was not excludable because it bore no
relation whatsoever to any personal injuries Schleier may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination. 51
In its recent decision in O'Gilvie v. United States, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the Schleier interpretation of the "on
account of' language of § 104(a)(2). O'Gilvie addressed the appli-
cability of § 104(a)(2) to punitive damages recovered in a tort
action by the spouse and children of a woman who had died of
toxic shock syndrome. The taxpayers argued that § 104(a)(2)
required only that they establish a "but for" connection between
the punitive damages recovered and the personal injuries sus-
tained. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court, relying on
Schleier, agreed with the Government that the words "on account
of' "impose a stronger causal connection making the provision
applicable only to those personal injury lawsuit damages that
were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal inju-
ries."52 In short, the Court underscored the Schleier analysis
that to be excludable under § 104(a)(2) the damages received
must be "designed to compensate" a victim for the personal inju-
50. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996)).
51. Again, the transcript of the oral argument in Schleier offers an interesting
insight into the thinking which may have prompted the Court to analyze the issues
as it ultimately did. At one point in the argument, Mr. Joyce, counsel for the tax-
payer, was questioned by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia asked whether the person who
brought the discrimination action had to have been aware at the time of her dis-
charge that the employer was discriminating against her on the basis of age. Mr.
Joyce responded that the individual did not have to show that she was aware at the
time of the discrimination. The following exchange then occurred:
Question: If the person didn't even know about it-but he's still entitled to
damages, isn't he?
Mr. Joyce: He is . . .
Questions: With no personal injury. So it's not even but-for.
Mr. Joyce: I disagree in one respect, Your Honor, respectfully. Congress pre-
sumes an injury to occur when invidious discrimination in violation of one
of these classifications occurs.




III. THE 1996 AMENDMENTS
It was against this backdrop of Burke and Schleier that
Congress amended § 104(a)(2) in 1996. The 1996 amendments
had two main purposes: first, to eliminate the exclusion for dam-
ages received on account of nonphysical injury or sickness; and
second, to establish that, subject to a limited exception, punitive
damages are not excludable regardless of whether they are re-
ceived in connection with a physical injury. As amended, the
statute now provides that gross income does not include:
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)
received .. on account of personal physical injuries or physi-
cal sickness ....
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not
be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. The preced-
ing sentence shall not apply to an amount of damages not in
excess of the amount paid for medical care ... attributable to
emotional distress.'
The more controversial aspect of the 1996 amendments was
the restriction of the exclusion to "physical" injury or sickness,
along with the explicit statutory direction that "emotional dis-
tress" is not to be treated-save only for related medical care
expenses-as a physical injury or sickness. It seems obvious from
the Conference Committee Report that discrimination claims
were the principal target of these provisions and that recoveries
under these claims are intended to be taxable.55
Furthermore, the committee report appears to anticipate an
argument that a nonphysical injury-e.g., one arising out of
employment discrimination-may sometimes produce physical
manifestations in the victim. To sort this out, the committee
report appears to rely on "origin-of-the-claim" notions in conjunc-
tion with the rule that "emotional distress" (itself a statutorily
undefined term) is not a physical injury or sickness. Thus, the
report provides:
[I]f an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical
sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that
flow therefrom are treated as payments received on account of
53. See id. at 455.
54. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1996).
55. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 737, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 142-43 (1996).
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physical injury or physical sickness whether or not the recipi-
ent of the damages is the injured party. For example, damages
(other than punitive damages) received by an individual on
account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the physical
injury or physical sickness of such individual's spouse are
excludable from gross income."
The report goes on to note that because emotional distress is not
a physical injury or physical sickness,
the exclusion from gross income does not apply to any damages
received (other than for medical expenses ... ) based on a
claim of employment discrimination or injury to reputation
accompanied by a claim of emotional distress .... [T]he exclu-
sion.., applies to any damages received based on a claim of
emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or
physical sickness.57
Emotional distress, according to the report, is intended to in-
clude "physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, stomach
disorders) which may result from such emotional distress." 8
The 1996 amendments, as filtered through the committee
report, thus (1) place enormous weight on whether the "origin" of
a claim lies in a physical injury, and (2) deny this all-important
physical injury status to a significant, but undefined range of
physical "symptoms" grouped under the term "emotional dis-
tress."
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE 1996 AMENDMENTS
This part of the article addresses five significant points re-
garding the 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2). First, dignitary
torts have lost their tax-favored status. Second, Congress has
apparently endorsed the exclusion of economic damages in par-
ticular circumstances. Third, Congress has left unanswered a
major question, i.e., what constitutes a physical injury for pur-
poses of § 104(a)(2)? Fourth, by eliminating an exclusion for
awards received on account of dignitary torts, Congress has per-
haps unwittingly rendered out-of-court settlement of employment
discrimination cases and other dignitary tort actions less likely.
Finally, in amending § 104(a)(2), Congress has failed to provide
employers and other tortfeasors with any assistance in address-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 143.
58. Id. at 142-43.
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ing the difficult problems associated with allocating settlements.
A. Impact on Dignitary Torts
In Schleier, the Supreme Court substantially restricted the
applicability of § 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination awards.
However, Schleier stopped short of eliminating an exclusion for
such awards. Congress went the next step-and further. The
1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2) eliminate entirely the exclusion
of awards received not only on account of employment discrimi-
nation, but also awards received on account of all dignitary torts,
i.e, injuries to one's personality or the dignity one has as a per-
son. By conditioning exclusion under § 104(a)(2) on the existence
of a personal physical injury, the 1996 amendments negate any
exclusion for damages resulting from dignitary torts such as
libel, slander, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of
mental anguish, invasion of privacy, denial of first amendment
rights, and alienation of affections. In so doing, the amendments
effectively reverse seventy-five years of judicial and administra-
tive development of § 104(a)(2).59
In enacting § 104(a)(2) in 1919, Congress may have under-
stood the term "personal injuries" as used in § 104(a)(2) to em-
brace only physical injuries. However the courts and the Service,
for the last seventy-five years, have interpreted "personal inju-
ries" to include both physical and nonphysical injuries. For Con-
gress in 1996 to reverse this longstanding interpretation of §
104(a)(2) and create a dichotomy between physical and nonphysi-
cal injuries seems ill-conceived and unjustifiable. Since 1919, the
concept of what constitutes personal injury has developed dra-
matically. Much of the body of law related to dignitary torts has
developed since then, and scientific research has brought an
awareness of the potentially devastating physical impacts of
psychological injuries. To provide tax-favored treatment when
one's action is grounded in a personal physical injury but not if
the action is grounded in an equally debilitating psychological
injury requires some strong justification. The justification offered
by Congress, however, is anything but compelling.
Congress explained its radical limitation on the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion on the basis that most awards received by taxpayers in
employment discrimination cases were intended to compensate
59. See generally Burke & Friel, supra note 3.
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the claimant for lost wages or lost profits.0 Indeed, lost profits
and wages are probably the best measure of damages sustained
by victims of employment discrimination. The suggestion of Con-
gress in the legislative history to the 1996 amendments seems
clear-§ 104(a)(2) should not provide an exclusion for awards
received for economic injuries.
It is not uncommon for dignitary torts to involve economic
injury in addition to mental distress, loss of self-esteem and
other personal injuries. Employment discrimination cases, which
represent the great majority of reported § 104(a)(2) cases in the
last twenty-five years, present the classic situations where the
injured party suffers both personal injury and economic loss.
Likewise, malicious prosecution, libel or slander may injure a
person's reputation in a community, resulting not only in serious
damage to her personal relationships with family, friends and
colleagues, but also in damage to her business or professional
standing.
Exclusion of the economic damages resulting from either
physical injuries or nonphysical injuries (the dignitary torts
noted previously) is difficult, if not impossible, to justify. Because
salary, wages and profits are the quintessential examples of
gross income,61 to permit tort victims to exclude from gross in-
come awards for the loss of such items represents a windfall. Yet
the exclusion of lost wages posited in the Schleier car accident
hypothetical was reaffirmed in the Supreme Court's recent "con-
cession" in O'Gilvie. Specifically, the language of § 104(a)(2):
excludes from taxation not only those damages that aim to
substitute for a victim's physical or personal well-be-
ing-personal assets that the Government does not tax and
would not have taxed had the victim not lost them. It also ex-
cludes from taxation those damages that substitute, say, for
lost wages, which would have been taxed had the victim earned
them. To that extent, the provisions can make the compensated
taxpayer better off from a tax perspective than had the person-
al injury not taken place.6"
The primary beneficiary of this exclusion may well be the
tortfeasor who will likely be able to settle claims for less because
the victim can exclude the settlement from gross income. For
example, assume that an employer fired an employee based upon
60. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 737, at 142-43.
61. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1996).
62. O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 455.
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the employee's race or sex. In the settlement of the subsequent
action based on wrongful discharge and sex or race discrimina-
tion, the employer may pay the employee an amount which is
primarily intended to compensate the employee for wages she
might otherwise have earned. Only part, and sometimes a rather
small part, of the settlement may represent compensation for
noneconomic injuries, i.e., injuries to the employee's personal
dignity. To exclude the entire award-a possibility which certain-
ly continued to exist even after Schleier (but before the 1996
amendments)-would permit the employee to exclude income
which, but for the illegal actions of the employer, would have
been includable. At the same time, if the exclusion were not
available, the employee might very well have demanded a far
larger settlement so as to take into account the impact of taxes.
The net result of the exclusion under such circumstances is to
create a tax benefit that the parties may share in some fashion,
and this reduces the amount that the employer must pay. Rather
than view only the employee as receiving a windfall because of
the exclusion of damages for economic injuries, it may also be
accurate to see the employer-tortfeasor as the real beneficiary of
the exclusion.
Were the judicially created "in lieu of what" standard63 con-
sistently applied to damages awards in personal injury cases,
and were appropriate allocation of judgments and awards made
between economic damages and compensation for the personal
elements of an award (e.g., broken arm, pain and suffering, men-
tal distress), the congressional concerns would have been laid to
rest. However, allocating an award will often not be feasible.
Perhaps Congress understood this, and for that reason chose to
eliminate the exclusion completely for damages arising out of
nonphysical injuries because cases involving such injuries, par-
ticularly the employment discrimination cases, typically involve
primarily economic damages. However, the fact is that in some
contexts, as discussed below, a very significant part of the award
may be intended as compensation for serious noneconomic per-
sonal injuries.
B. Continued Exclusion of Economic Awards
Ironically, the amendments to § 104(a)(2) do not fully ad-
dress the problem of exclusion of economic damages. While Con-
63. See Raytheon, 144 F.2d at 110.
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gress expressed grave concern about the exclusion of economic
damages, the legislative history suggests that lost wages will be
excludable under § 104(a)(2) when they are a consequence of a
physical injury." In this regard, Congress appears to have
adopted the less stringent Schleier definition of the "on account
of" language of § 104(a)(2).6" That taxpayers can exclude lost in-
come when the injury claim has its origin in a physical injury is
unwarranted and only exacerbates the problems associated with
the dichotomy that Congress has drawn between physical and
nonphysical injuries.
Consider the following hypotheticals.
HYPOTHETICAL 1: Doctor, a surgeon in a solo-practice, is seri-
ously injured in a ski accident and brings a negligence action
against the owner of the ski resort. Doctor seeks damages for
all past and future medical expenses associated with the acci-
dent, damages for pain and suffering, and damages for lost
income as a result of being unable to perform surgery for more
than a year following the accident. Doctor and the ski resort
settle the matter out of court for $1,500,000.
This hypothetical presents the classic personal physical
injury for which § 104(a)(2) has traditionally provided an exclu-
sion. The personal injury requirement of § 104(a)(2) is clearly
satisfied in this case. In addition, under the Schleier standard,
the award is received "on account of' the personal physical inju-
ry. The requisite linkage exists between the damage award and a
personal injury, i.e., the ski resort intended to compensate Doc-
tor for the personal injury and the consequences stemming there-
from. As a result, all damages flowing from the personal injury,
including the lost income, will be excludable.
HYPOTHETICAL 2: A newspaper printed a story falsely accusing
Doctor (the same individual in Hypothetical 1) of committing a
serious felony. As a result, Doctor was suspended from practic-
ing surgery, was required to defend herself in a grueling license
revocation proceeding before the state medical board, and ulti-
mately lost a significant number of her patients. Doctor suf-
fered severe emotional distress and, at one point, was hospi-
64. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 737, at 142. The Conference Committee Report
does not specifically state that economic damages such as lost wages or lost profits
will be excludable. Rather, it simply states that "[i]f an action has its origin in a
physical injury, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical sick-
ness . . . ." See id. (emphasis added).
65. See id. (mentioning specifically the Supreme Court's decision in Schleier).
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talized for depression. The pressures experienced by Doctor's
family as a result of the problems associated with the libelous
statements in the press and the license revocation procedures
and Doctor's resulting psychological problems had a deleterious
impact on Doctor's marriage and ultimately resulted in a di-
vorce. In settlement of the libel action brought by Doctor, the
newspaper paid Doctor $1,500,000 in compensation for her loss
of personal and business reputation, the emotional distress that
she suffered and is suffering, her medical costs and her lost
income.
Doctor in Hypothetical 2 would presumably have been enti-
tled to exclude the entire amount of the award under § 104(a)(2)
prior to its amendment. It appears that all of the requirements
of the old § 104(a)(2) as interpreted by Schleier are satisfied.'
However, as a result of the amendments to § 104(a)(2), the
award will be taxable in its entirety. 7 Because Doctor's libel
action did not have its origin in a personal physical injury, she is
not entitled to exclude any part of the award. As in Hypothetical
1, it is likely that a significant portion of the award is allocable
to lost income. Focusing specifically on that part of the award,
§ 104(a)(2), as amended, reaches an appropriate result in Hypo-
thetical 2 in denying an exclusion.
It is difficult to justify the difference in treatment between
the lost income portion of the award in Hypothetical 1 and that
in Hypothetical 2. The legislative history fails to explain why
economic damages should be excludable when they have their
origin in a physical injury, but not be excludable when they have
their origin in a nonphysical personal injury. Congress seems to
have adopted the same interpretation of the "on account of" lan-
guage of § 104(a)(2) as that provided by the Supreme Court in
Schleier, that is, any damages including lost wages that flow
directly from a personal injury are excludable as being "on ac-
count of personal injury" if the payor intends to compensate the
victim for the personal injury.' However, as previously noted
the Supreme Court in Schleier failed to interpret § 104(a)(2) as
66. Doctor suffered a personal injury, i.e., libel, and as a direct result of the
injury suffered emotional distress and lost a considerable amount of income. The
newspaper intended to compensate Doctor for her personal injury and the conse-
quences flowing from it.
67. To the extent that the award is allocable to medical expenses attributable
to emotional distress, the amendments specifically provide for exclusion. However, the
exclusion is limited, to amounts actually paid. No exclusion apparently exists for
amounts awarded to cover future medical expenses.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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narrowly as it might have.69
Hypothetical 2 also underscores a further problem with the
1996 amendments, i.e., the treatment of emotional distress. As
noted previously, Congress in amending § 104(a)(2) specifically
provided that emotional distress is not considered a physical
injury or sickness. As a result, Doctor in Hypothetical 2, al-
though suffering severe emotional distress and associated physi-
cal ailments, e.g., headaches, vomiting, loss of appetite and
sleeplessness, could not ground a claim for exclusion under
§ 104(a)(2) on emotional distress and related symptoms. The fact
that Doctor had to be under the constant care of a physician and
even hospitalized for a period would not change the result.
Conversely, amounts received for emotional distress are
excluded if they have their origin in a physical injury. Again,
consider Hypothetical 1 and assume that Doctor in that case had
suffered emotional distress as a result of being unable to practice
her profession. She would be entitled to exclude the award re-
ceived for emotional distress. As the legislative history indicates:
"[b]ecause all damages received on account of physical injury or
physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion
from gross income applies to any damages received based on a
claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical
injury or physical sickness."70
The difference in treatment suggests a fundamental distrust
on the part of Congress in the reality of emotional distress and
associated problems in conjunction with dignitary torts, especial-
ly claims of employment discrimination. Only if the emotional
distress is attributable to a personal physical injury will damag-
es for emotional distress be excludable. Otherwise, it will be
ignored. One can only surmise that Congress recognized that if
emotional distress constituted a physical injury for purposes of §
104(a)(2), the congressional purpose of negating an exclusion for
damages on account of dignitary torts like employment discrimi-
nation would be largely thwarted. For example, in virtually ev-
ery case of employment discrimination, a victim could be expect-
69. Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently in O'Gilvie explicitly suggested
that the exclusion of lost wages might be "something of an anomaly" from the stand-
point of tax policy. See O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 456. Nonetheless, the Court noted that
it was an anomaly grounded in the "language and history" of § 104(a)(2). See id. at
117 S. Ct. at 459. As O'Gilvie acknowledged, the "on account of' language of
§104(a)(2) is inherently ambiguous. See id. at 455. Surely, it would have been prefer-
able for both the Schleier and O'Gilvie Courts to interpret the language in a manner
consistent with tax policy rather that perpetuate an unjustifiable windfall.
70. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 737, at 142-43.
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ed to argue that she suffered emotional distress as a result of the
employer's actions and was suing the employer to recover for
that injury. But for the amendment language denying physical
injury or physical sickness status to emotional distress, the
taxpayer's action would come within the exclusionary rule of
amended § 104(a)(2).
In so treating claims of emotional distress, Congress has
devalued the suffering experienced by individuals as a result of
psychological injury. That suffering can be-and often is--even
greater than the pain and suffering associated with a physical
injury. There is, for example, as much reality to the emotional
distress experienced by Doctor in Hypothetical 2 as there is to
the pain suffered by Doctor in Hypothetical 1. And yet for tax
purposes, Doctor's suffering in Hypothetical 2 is ignored while
the award for her pain and suffering in Hypothetical 1 is ex-
cluded. The message is clear: if one is psychologically injured,
one receives little sympathy from the Congress; if one is physi-
cally injured, Congress makes significant tax relief available.
The difference in treatment of the taxpayers in the hypothetical
emphasizes the questionable nature of the policy underlying the
physical and nonphysical dichotomy wrought by the 1996 amend-
ments.
The emphasis on physical injuries will in some cases permit
exclusion of substantial damages where the personal injuries are
trivial while disallowing an exclusion in situations like Hypo-
thetical 2 where the personal injuries are very serious. Consider,
for example, a situation where Photographer, seeking to take a
photograph of Celebrity, is slugged and restrained by Celebrity's
bodyguard. Photographer suffers nothing more than a black eye
as a result of the confrontation. Photographer sues Celebrity,
who, because of embarrassment over the situation and a desire
to avoid a trial, which would be highly publicized, settles with
Photographer for a large sum of money. Under these circum-
stances, Photographer will be entitled to exclude the full amount
of the recovery even though his actual injuries pale by compari-
son to those of Doctor in Hypothetical 2.
C. What Constitutes a "Physical Injury?"
Aside from the problems relating to economic damages and
the treatment of emotional distress, the amendments also leave
unanswered an important question, i.e., what is a "physical inju-
ry"? Must there be serious bodily harm? Is a mere slap in the
face enough? What about unlawful sexual contact? To the extent
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that any unlawful physical contact constitutes a "physical injury"
for purposes of § 104(a)(2), one can expect some very question-
able tax distinctions in situations which are difficult to distin-
guish. Compare the possible tax results in the following
hypotheticals:
HYPOTHETICAL 3: Boss continually invites Secretary on dates
and makes suggestive comments about her attire. Secretary re-
fuses Boss's advance and warns him that she will report him to
the company's management. Boss subsequently fires Secretary.
Secretary can establish that she has suffered significant emo-
tional distress as a result of Boss' action and has incurred ex-
pense for both medical and psychological care associated with
her emotional distress problems. Secretary files a sex discrimi-
nation charge against the company and Boss, seeking damages
for emotional distress and lost wages. Secretary also seeks
reinstatement in her position. Assume that Secretary and the
company enter into a settlement agreement whereby the com-
pany pays Secretary $150,000 for release of all of her claims
including her claim for reinstatement.
HYPOTHETICAL 4: Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 3
and, in addition, assume that the day before Boss fired Sec-
retary an incident occurred in which Boss walked up behind
Secretary and began rubbing her shoulders and fondling her.
Enraged by Boss's conduct, Secretary left the office and did not
return to work that day. Fearing that Secretary might report
him, Boss fired her the next day. Again, the company settled
Secretary's claim for $150,000.71
In Hypothetical 3, Secretary's award will not be excludable.
Secretary's claim did not have its origin in a physical injury. The
reality is that a substantial portion of the award would likely be
allocable to lost wages and, as a matter of policy, should not be
excludable. As in Hypothetical 2, Secretary has suffered a signifi-
cant noneconomic injury as well and yet, while it is compensated
for to some extent, no exclusion is available.
In contrast, Secretary in Hypothetical 4 arguably has a
claim that has its origin in a personal physical injury, i.e., the
unwanted touching. If successful in arguing the physical injury
origin of the action, Secretary may be entitled to exclude the
entire $150,000 under § 104(a)(2) as amended. Assume, for ex-
71. These hypotheticals are drawn from a previously-published article by the
authors. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K Friel, What Schleier and Amended
§ 104(a)(2) Mean to Your Practice, TRIAL, Nov. 1996, at 64, 66.
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ample, that the lost income portion of the award is attributable
to the fact that because of the psychological injury suffered as a
result of the unwanted touching, Secretary was unable to work
for a number of months. Under these circumstances, the neces-
sary linkage as required by Schleier exists to support an exclu-
sion." The damages are intended to compensate Secretary for
the physical injury and the consequences flowing therefrom, i.e.,
the psychological injuries and the consequent inability to work.
As discussed previously, the difference in the tax treatment
in situations such as these is not justifiable. If, in fact, the term
"physical injury" as used in amended § 104(a)(2) is capable of
being read as requiring something less than a serious bodily
injury, 3 one would expect thorough trial attorneys to search for,
and occasionally find, a plausible physical injury that their cli-
ents who are victims of dignitary torts have also suffered.
However, for Treasury to attempt to negate an exclusion for
Secretary's damage award in Hypothetical 4 by drafting a regu-
lation creating a more stringent physical injury standard pres-
ents its own problems. How does one draw the line between a
physical injury which is cognizable under § 104(a)(2) and one
that is not? Must the taxpayer have received medical attention?
Obviously, that would not solve the problem. Must the injury be
something which at a minimum would be considered greater
than a bruise, but less than a broken bone? As one considers the
various possibilities, what becomes clear is that Congress, in
attempting to rectify the perceived problems associated with the
application of § 104(a)(2), has only created new problems by
creating a dichotomy between physical and nonphysical injuries.
D. Impact on the Settlement of Cases
A further problem potentially created by the amendments to
§ 104(a)(2) is the negative impact which the denial of exclusion
of awards in dignitary tort cases may have on the settlement of
those cases. To comprehend this problem, one only has to consid-
er the financial position in which the amendments may place an
employer.
Assume again, for example, the facts of Hypothetical 3 in-
volving Secretary and Boss in the situation where the entire
72. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
73. Except for its treatment of emotional distress, Congress provided neither
guidance as to definition of the term "physical injury" nor did it suggest that the
severity of a physical injury would be relevant in the application of § 104(a)(2).
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award is taxable under amended § 104(a)(2). The employer will
likely face a problem settling the case for the dollar amount
indicated. Presumably, the attorney representing Secretary will
inform her that anything she recovers by way of a settlement or
judgement will be subject to federal income tax, state income
tax, and employment taxes. These taxes will have an enormous
impact on the amount which Secretary ultimately receives. When
combined with the amount of fees which she has to pay the at-
torney, Secretary will likely receive less than half of the
$150,000 award.74 As a result, taxpayers who, like Secretary in
Hypothetical 3 or Doctor in Hypothetical 2, are victims of digni-
tary torts may refuse to settle unless the tortfeasor offers enough
to offset the tax impact.
Therefore, the settlement of employment discrimination and
other dignitary tort cases may cost businesses far more. That
result is not necessarily all bad. As suggested above, under prior
law, the tortfeasor can be considered the beneficiary of the §
104(a)(2) exclusion to the extent that the tortfeasor was able to
settle cases more cheaply because of the exclusion. In contrast,
however, avoidance of costly litigation is not only a benefit to the
parties but also to society generally. To the extent that the
amendments to § 104(a)(2) result in fewer negotiated settlements
and the trial of more personal injury cases, everyone loses.
E. Allocation of Award
One of the vexing problems in the application of § 104(a)(2)
prior to its amendment was the proper allocation of awards.
Employers have been particularly concerned about the amount of
the award to be treated as income and therefore subject to with-
holding. Likewise, employers have been concerned about the
payment of various employment taxes related to the lost wages
or back pay portions of certain damage awards. In one sense, the
74. One of the interesting twists of the amendments to § 104(a)(2) has to do
with the deductibility of attorneys fees. Section 265(a)(1) will prevent a § 212 deduc-
tion for attorneys fees in situations where § 104(a)(2) excludes an amount from in-
come. Thus, prior to the amendments to § 104(a)(2), awards for a range of dignitary
torts were excludable. The attorneys fees for such awards were therefore not deduct-
ible. Now that the amendments to § 104(a)(2) have largely rendered damages for
dignitary torts includable in income, taxpayers receiving such awards will now be
entitled to claim a § 212 deduction for the attorneys fees incurred in producing this
income. Unfortunately, the deduction will be subject to the 2% rule of § 67 and the




amendment to § 104(a)(2) may be greeted by employers as sim-
plifying the issues regarding withholding. The employer may
now assume that, in situations where there is no physical injury,
employment discrimination awards will simply be taxable and
appropriate withholding must occur. However, the fact remains
that a determination will nonetheless have to be made regarding
amounts allocable to lost wages or back pay for purposes of em-
ployment taxes. Here again, the very existence of the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion becomes problematic as the 1996 amendments supply
no solution.
Consider once more Hypothetical 4, involving Secretary who
recovered an award to compensate her for the unwanted touch-
ing by her Boss. If one assumes that some of the award repre-
sents lost income as a result of Secretary's inability to find work
following her being fired, the lost income under those circum-
stances would apparently not be excludable given the Schleier
standard. The loss of income in that case would not be a conse-
quence of the unwanted touching but rather a consequence of the
illegal firing. This is to be contrasted to the situation where the
lost income is a result of Secretary's inability to work because of
the psychological injuries suffered. The employer is faced with
the task of determining how much of the award represents lost
income for purposes of withholding tax and other employment
taxes.
The allocation issue, of course, extends to cases beyond the
employment context. Consider again, for example, Hypothetical 2
involving Doctor who is injured as a result of the false newspa-
per story. As noted in the discussion of that hypothetical, one
presumes that a large portion of the settlement is allocable to
lost income. An interesting question arises here with respect to
self-employment taxes: Will Doctor be required to allocate part of
the award to lost income and pay a self-employment tax with
respect to that amount? Arguably, that allocation should be re-
quired. The difficulty will be found in determining the appro-
priate sum to be allocated to lost income. Assume that Doctor,
who is already required to include the entire amount of the
award in income, negotiates a settlement with the newspaper
indicating that the entire award is allocable to the emotional
distress and resulting personal difficulties which Doctor suffered
as a result of the newspaper's conduct. Nothing is allocated to
lost income, or only a relatively small amount is allocated to lost
income.
Clearly, the Service, as it demonstrated in the recent cases
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of McKay v. Commissioner,75 Robinson v. Commissioner,7" and
75. 102 T.C. 465 (1994). In McKay, the taxpayer alleged that his employer had
breached their employment contract and had wrongfully discharged the employee in
violation of public policy. See id. at 470. A jury awarded taxpayer over $1.6 million
for lost compensation and over $12.8 million for "future damages." See id. at 470-71.
The damages were then trebled to over $43 million for the employer's violation of
RICO. See id. at 471. The taxpayer and the employer ultimately settled for approxi-
mately $16 million, with over $12 million specifically allocated in the settlement
agreement to taxpayer's wrongful discharge tort claim and the balance allocated to
taxpayer's contract claim. See id. at 472. The settlement negotiations were ad-
versarial, the employer insisting that nothing be allocated to either RICO violations
or punitive damages. See id. at 472-73. The settlement agreement specifically provid-
ed that the amount allocated for the wrongful discharge tort claim "represent[ed]
compensatory damages payable on account of an alleged tort-type invasion of the
rights that McKay is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law
[and] are properly excludable from McKay's gross income under Section
104(a)(2). . .. " Id. at 472. The agreement also provided that the balance of the
payments were includable in McKay's gross income. See id. The district court judge
approved the settlement agreement and concluded that the terms of that agreement,
including the allocations, were reasonable under the circumstances. See id. at 474.
The Service argued that, because the payments made by the defendant were
deductible regardless of their allocation between tort and contract claims, the settle-
ment negotiations were not adversarial. See id. at 484-85. The Tax Court rejected
the Service's arguments, emphasizing that where a settlement agreement is the re-
sult of arms-length, adversarial negotiations the allocations will generally be respect-
ed. See id. at 483-85. The court specifically distinguished this case from Robinson v.
Commissioner on the grounds that the settlement negotiations in the latter case
lacked the adversarial dimension present in McKay. See id at 483-84.
Emphasizing the importance of the settlement agreement and other documents,
the court noted:
If no lawsuit was instituted by the taxpayer, then we must consider any
relevant documents, letters, and testimony. . . . If a lawsuit was filed but
not settled, or if settled but no express allocations among the various
claims are contained in the settlement agreement, we must consider the
pleadings, jury awards, or any Court orders or judgments . . . . If the
taxpayer's claims were settled and express allocations among the various
claims are contained in the settlement agreement, we carefully consider
such allocations .... [Un order to be respected, the express allocations
must be negotiated at arm's length between adverse parties.
Id. at 482-483.
It is obvious from the language used in the pleadings and settlement agree-
ment in McKay that counsel was well aware of the relevant case law under §
104(a)(2) and used that to the advantage of McKay. By contrast, the settlement
agreement in Robinson (discussed infra note 76) is silent on the matter of allocation.
76. 102 T.C. 116 (1994). In Robinson, the taxpayers sued a bank for failing to
release a lien on the taxpayers' property. See id. at 120-21. The taxpayers alleged
that, as a result of the bank's actions, their business failed, they were forced to sell
their business inventory and property at substantial losses, and that Sandra Robin-
son developed severe psychological problems requiring hospitalization. See id. The
taxpayers complained that the bank's failure to release the lien was "willful, an act
of malice and in reckless and conscious disregard of petitioners' rights, unconsciona-
ble, based on false representations, tortious, and a cloud on title." Id. at 120.
The jury agreed and awarded damages for lost profits, actual damages, dam-
age to taxpayers' credit reputation, past and future mental anguish of the parties,
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Bagley v. Commissioner71 is prepared to dispute allocations re-
attorneys fees and $50 million in punitive damages. See id. at 121. The parties ulti-
mately entered into a settlement agreement whereby the bank paid the taxpayers
$10 million in cash in exchange for complete release from all liability. See id. at 122-
23. Recognizing the taxpayers desire to avoid taxes, the bank agreed that the tax-
payers could allocate the settlement agreement any way they chose. See id. at 123.
The settlement agreement did not allocate the $10 million. See id. The taxpayers,
with the agreement of the bank, unilaterally prepared a formal Final Judgment allo-
cating 95% of settlement proceeds to tort-like personal injuries and the presiding
judge signed the final judgment. See id.
The Tax Court held that it was not bound by the judgment. See id. at 129.
The court determined that it could make an independent determination of the proper
allocation of the settlement proceeds: "[Tihis Court will not blindly accept the terms
contained in a settlement agreement, especially when the circumstances behind the
agreement indicate that the allocation of the amounts contained therein was uncon-
tested, nonadversarial, and entirely tax motivated." Id. The Tax Court ultimately
held that the taxpayers could exclude 37.3% of the settlement under § 104(aX2) with
the balance being includable in gross income. See id. at 135-36.
77. 105 T.C. 396 (1995). In Bagley, the taxpayer and his employer entered into
a settlement agreement whereby the employer agreed to pay the taxpayer $1.5 mil-
lion to settle a libel action which was being retried in a federal district court. See id.
at 402. In view of the prior history of litigation between the parties, the employer,
in settling the matter, was aware that if the matter were retried, the taxpayer
would receive punitive damages. See id. at 403. However, the settlement agreement
allocated the entire award to actual injuries (i.e., invasion of privacy, injury to per-
sonal reputation including defamation, emotional distress and pain and suffering). See
id. at 403-04. The court emphasized that the critical question in determining the tax
status of a settlement was "in lieu of what was the settlement amount paid." Id. at
406. The court, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, noted that the
total amount of compensatory damages that the taxpayer would have likely recovered
in the libel action had taxpayer been successful would have been $1 million, the
amount a jury had previously awarded. See id. at 408. (The same jury had awarded
$5 million in punitive damages. The jury award was reversed not because of its
amount but because of faulty jury instructions. See id.) The court stated:
Although the record supports the fact that counsel for IBP [the tortfeasor]
did not want to show an allocation to punitive damages, the record as a
whole, including the discussion and give-and-take between the parties as to
the amount to be paid to petitioner [the taxpayer], shows that both parties
considered the clear possibility of petitioner recovering punitive damages. In
fact, the testimony of the attorneys shows that this was in the minds of
the attorneys when the negotiations were going on. Furthermore, it was
clearly in the interest of both parties not to show an amount allocated to
punitive damages.
Id. at 409.
The court ultimately allocated $500,000 of the settlement to punitive damages
and $1 million to compensatory damages. See id. at 410. The court distinguished
McKay, noting that the tortfeasor in McKay specifically stated in the settlement
agreement that no part of the settlement was allocable to the alleged RICO violation;
in Bagley by comparison there was no specific statement in the settlement agreement
with respect to punitive damages. See id. at 408. The Bagley decision also empha-
sized that McKay involved an adversarial situation between the tortfeasor and the
plaintiff'taxpayer and that the taxpayer "was never given freedom to structure the
settlement on his own." Id. Together, McKay and Bagley emphasize the importance of
arm's length, adversarial settlement negotiations where both parties have a stake in
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sulting from settlement negotiations which it does not consider
to be arms-length.78 Given that the payor, like the newspaper in
Hypothetical 2, will often be indifferent to the allocations made
in the settlement agreement,79 a strong likelihood exists that al-
locations generally will be subject to careful scrutiny by the Ser-
vice. Under the circumstances presented in the above hypothet-
ical, one would expect the Service, consistent with its position in
McKay, Robinson, and Bagley,"° to challenge the allocation and
insist that some, if not most, of the settlement be allocated to the
lost income.
One can easily imagine the enormous difficulty associated
with allocating settlements in situations in which multiple
claims for relief are alleged. In its Brief Amicus Curiae in
Schleier, the Equal Employment Advisory Council, arguing in
favor of the exclusion of ADEA awards, posited a hypothetical in
which the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case is a
disabled, fifty-five year-old black woman.81 The brief notes that
"there are at least four causes of action to which the settlement
could be allocated: ADEA, ADA, Title VII and section 1981, not
to mention state statutory and tort claims that may offer other
remedies."" As the brief emphasizes, "[e]ven if the parties un-
dergo extensive discovery of the facts, it often will be impossible
to unravel this 'bundle' of rights in order to place a separate
value upon each specific claim the plaintiff might have asserted
in the charge or complaint."83
the characterization of the award and the significance of specific language in the
settlement agreement indicating that none of the settlement amount is allocable to
punitive damages or other non-excludable amounts.
78. For a general discussion of the McKay and Robinson decisions and issues
associated with the allocation of damage awards, see Jon. 0. Shields, Note, Exclusion
of Damages Derived from Personal Injury Settlements: Tax-Planning Considerations in
Light of McKay v. Commissioner, 56 MONT. L. REV. 603 (1995).
79. The newspaper would generally be entitled to claim a § 162 deduction for
the award regardless of how the award is allocated. See I.R.C. § 162 (1994). In some
circumstances, for example, employer-tortfeasor, the payor may be very concerned
about the allocation. The employer presumably would prefer that as little as possible
is allocated to lost income because of employer's exposure to employment taxes for
such amounts.
80. In both Robinson and Bagley, the Service, emphasizing that allocations must
reflect the merits of a case, suggested that it would weigh the evidence in each case
to determine the appropriateness of allocations. See Robinson, 102 T.C. at 117;
Bagley, 105 T.C. at 406. The Tax Court in both cases adopted this approach of the
Service.
81. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Sup-





The brief argues that the Service is ill-equipped to conduct
the kind of investigation needed to determine the appropriate
allocation of awards and that the threat of such investigation
will in and of itself distort, if not chill, the negotiation process.'
Those concerns seem well founded. Allocation of settlement
amounts may require not only a careful weighing of the relative
strength of different causes of action which have been plead, but
also of other factors. For example, in McKay, the defendant's
desire to avoid admitting RICO violations resulted in the defen-
dant agreeing to compensate the taxpayer on certain claims for
relief and not others. Presumably, it will be quite difficult for the
Service to determine when a defendant's stated concerns are
genuine and when they merely represent an accommodation of a
plaintiff-taxpayer seeking the benefit of § 104(a)(2).5 In addi-
tion, because the parties will want some certainty regarding the
tax treatment to be accorded a settlement, the threat of the Ser-
vice challenging the allocations in cases involving multiple
claims may so distort the settlement negotiation process that one
or both parties may insist on taking the case to trial.
V. SOLUTION
The difficulties with the new § 104(a)(2) are such that the
obvious solution appears to be to repeal the exclusion in its en-
tirety. Such a solution, however, runs counter to the congressio-
nal solicitude, expressed in §§ 104(a)(3) and 105(b) and (c), for
those compensated through accident and health insurance for
their personal injuries or sickness. Section 104(a)(3) excludes all
84. See id. at 20-21. The brief states:
[D]ifferential tax treatment of various causes of action would put the IRS
and courts adjudicating tax disputes in the business of evaluating the
strength and weaknesses of the causes of action when overseeing the
parties' allocation of damages. The IRS does not have the expertise and the
courts will not necessarily have the resources to make such judgments and
should not be put in the position of second-guessing the parties' own evalu-
ation of the value of the various claims to which the settlement is allocat-
ed. Such judgments are inherently subjective and cannot be resolved with-
out extensive discovery and examination of witnesses-the very types of
inquiry that a settlement is designed to avoid.
Id.
85. Another instructive case in which the court respected a specific allocation in
a settlement agreement is McShane v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 409 (1987).
There the settlement agreement, entered into after a jury verdict, provided that none
of the settlement constituted prejudgment interest. See id. at 410. The court conclud-
ed that it was not unreasonable for the parties to negotiate a settlement which did
not include an interest element. See id. at 412.
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amounts received through such insurance, provided those
amounts are not attributable to nontaxable employer contribu-
tions and were not paid by the employer. To the extent those
amounts are so attributable, § 105 provides a narrower exclu-
sion: amounts paid to the taxpayer to reimburse the taxpayer for
medical care expenses are generally excludable under § 105(b)
and amounts paid for permanent disfigurement or permanent
loss (or loss of use) of a member or function of the body are
excludable under § 105(c) provided those payments are computed
with reference to the nature of the injury and without regard to
the period of absence from work.
Several years ago, in a previous article in this journal, the
authors suggested that there "would likely be little quarrel with
a congressional decision to exclude from income for humanitari-
an reasons a limited category of personal injury awards,"86 and
that an exclusion patterned on § 105 "might offer the most prom-
ise of a policy-based tax treatment of damages for personal inju-
ries or sickness."87 At the time, we reasoned as follows:
The Section 104(a)(2) exclusion for personal injuries or sickness
should be no greater than that provided by other provisions of §
104 and § 105. Section 104(a)(3) and section 105 distinguish
between the tax treatment of proceeds of health and accident
insurance based on whether the insurance is employer-provided
or employee-provided. As between the two, the damages re-
ceived by a tort victim may be better analogized to employer-
provided insurance, since in both instances the recipient has no
after-tax "investment" attributable to the amounts received. If
the analogy is accepted, then consistent with § 104(a)(3) and
105, the damages received under § 104(a)(2) should be
includable in income-except to the extent they are attributable
to amounts expended for medical care in a manner similar to §
105(b), and except to the extent they are attributable to per-
manent disability or disfigurement in a manner similar to §
105(c). Such an approach would end the exclusion for nonphysi-
cal injuries and for physical injuries that are not serious ones,
yet would maintain a compassionate response for recoveries on
account of the most serious physical injuries.8 8
Consider the operation of a § 105 approach to the earlier
hypotheticals. Were § 105(b) and (c) to replace amended §
104(a)(2), Doctor in Hypothetical 1 could only exclude that
86. Burke & Friel, supra note 3, at 45.
87. Id. at 46.
88. Id. at 46-47.
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amount of the settlement which was allocable to the medical
expenses Doctor incurred as a result of the ski accident. In con-
trast to the results under current law, Doctor could not exclude
any amounts received for pain and suffering or for lost income. A
§ 105-approach would provide the same results as under current
law for Doctor in Hypothetical 2 who was the victim of libel-she
could only exclude the medical expenses she incurred as a result
of the emotional distress caused her by the libelous actions of the
newspaper. A § 105-based approach would thus negate the un-
justifiable differences in the tax treatment of the settlements in
the hypothetical under current law.
Similarly, the potentially different tax treatment of Secre-
tary in Hypothetical 3 and 4 dealing with sex discrimination
would not exist if a § 105 approach were used instead of the
exclusion standard of amended § 104(a)(2). There would be no
need to determine whether a physical injury had occurred when
Boss rubbed Secretary's shoulders and fondled her. Secretary in
each hypothetical situation would be entitled to exclude only
those amounts intended to compensate her for medical expenses.
Section 105 may thus provide an imperfect, but reasonable
template for a future § 104(a)(2). To the extent one's personal in-
juries are compensated for by tortfeasors-as by employers' in-
surance plans-the payments are taxable, except for medical
expense reimbursements and a narrow class of injuries or sick-
ness where the loss of human capital is terribly severe and the
payment therefore is demonstrably unconnected with loss of
wages. The focus on the severity of the human capital loss and
the disconnection from lost wages are the central features of
§ 105(c). They remain conspicuously absent from the new
§ 104(a)(2), which now, paradoxically, continues to preserve tax
benefits for the mundane physical personal injury award, includ-
ing its lost wages component, while denying those benefits to
even the most severe nonphysical personal injury or sickness
award that contains no lost wages component.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress, in amending § 104(a)(2), has dramatically limited
the scope of the exclusion for damages received on account of
personal injuries and sickness. The 1996 amendments place
enormous weight on whether the "origin" of the claim lies in a
physical injury and deny physical injury status to a significant,
but undefined range of physical "symptoms" grouped under the
term "emotional distress." As demonstrated by the hypotheticals
19971
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presented in this article, the new legislative limits not only raise
serious interpretational questions but also produce tax results
which are not supportable from the standpoint of tax policy.
While old § 104(a)(2) was in need of remedy, Congress could
have devised a better remedy than that reflected in the 1996
amendments. An exclusion standard based upon the § 105 para-
digm would have been far superior to that chosen by Congress.
The new § 104(a)(2) is expedient, understandable, and wrong.
